I could continue this series, but will conclude by describing the most important of them all: Schreider, the head of the whole Vau-group, who has again been liberated. This man was the greatest war-criminal of them all, but in Zaayer's opinion Schreider is blameless. And to top it all the Netherlands Government gave Schreider a small car and a room in the Oud Wassenaar Castle and soft-boiled eggs for breakfast. Other Vau-men, however, were treated differently.

Kuntz, liberated after the German occupation in order to get his rehabilitation papers from the underground movement, was loaded into a car and murdered by the well-known illegal 'killer', Jos de Groot. This murder, clear as the nose on anyone's face, was never investigated. Breed, was sentenced to death, although proof of his guilt was never established. Anthony van der Waals, who refused to be hidden by the Intelligence Service, was also sentenced to death while his trial gave so much reason for thought that even Lunshof found it necessary to write a brochure on the subject entitled 'A Study in Injustice'.

Vau-man Lindeman, alias King Kong, died in gaol of arsenic poisoning. It is still a mystery whether he was poisoned or committed suicide. The nurse, who joined him was examined - King Kong was left to die.

But there is more: it has been irrevocably ascertained that all the material required by the V-men to complete their murderous activities, came exclusively from Britain via the mysterious Englandspiel. Consequently, these Vau-men were the link between the Englandspiel and its victims. They were killers, armed by the information received through the Englandspiel.

Why this mysterious atmosphere, which envelops the V-men? Why this difference of treatment; why this silence, or this camouflaged justice? Because these people, in their role of penetration agent, or ordinary German V-man, hold information on 'the greatest of all spy tragedies: 'The Englandspiel".

The true story of the E-spiel may not and cannot under any circumstances be revealed. The result would be, politically speaking, an atom bomb in a china shop.

Murder, camouflaged law cases, bribery, any crime is permissable, as long as it will serve to hide the truth about the Englandspiel.

BUT IT CAN NO LONGER BE KEPT SECRET, because the Intelligence Service made a capital blunder. They allowed Anthony van der Waals to live, and let him be used for a camouflaged trial, with the purpose of blaming him for everything and an attempt to distract attention from those who were REALLY guilty. But van der Waals refused to accept a crooked lawyer. He has made up his mind and intends to speak the whole truth. He was silent during the whole trial, but only because he wanted his accusers to lay their cards on the table. In this book he reveals all his trumps and will prove that it is possible to unmask all the Vau-men.

Before his case comes up again, the whole of this country will know the true role of the V-men - of Schreider - of how the Englandspiel was conducted.

Noel de Gaulle, in an attempt to cloak the Englandspiel in a, let us say, modern shroud, has lifted the veil on some important developments. These I will gratefully use in my story. First, I will discuss the Englandspiel. My second story will concern van der Waals himself.

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them to the outside world. We should

deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such ~~p~~ practices. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to ~~remark~~ embark at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the accusation that we were trying to conceal

something

THE ENGLANDSPIEL

I should like to advise people who still harbour the illusion that the world is inhabited by honest and kindhearted souls not to read this book, for the simple reason that I intend to expose the greatest of all mass murderers: the man who sent his victims to Luttringhausen, Bergen-Belsen, Mauthausen and Oranienburg.

To begin with: the Englandspiel is NO SECRET AT ALL, since every professional spy knows all the facts, as do a number of high Government officials and important industrialists. Even Noel de Gaulle knows the whole story.

We do not need a Parliamentary inquiry committee to understand the E-spiel; on the contrary, this committee is only trying to give the impression that there is some intricate secret, which requires the assistance of a number of clever legal experts, to unravel it. This is nonsense. The Englandspiel is so simple that a small boy would have no difficulty in understanding it. If we place all the facts behind one another the truth will emerge automatically.

FIRST WE HAVE THE PERSONS AND THE PLACE WHERE THE DRAMA TOOK PLACE. It is war-time and we are now writing in the year 1942. On the one side of the North Sea is Mr. Bingham, Major of the Intelligence Service in Baker Street, London, who receives all messages from the occupied territories. On the other side, in The Hague, is his cousin, Herr Hauptmann Bingham, the brain trust of Schreider and Giskes, who is so far removed to the background, that he is able to remain in The Hague for a considerable time and is now, I believe, somewhere in Borneo.

Herr Major Giskes, is the head of the 'Nachrichtendienst' of the 'Abwehr', also counter-espionage, i.e. the service whose duty it was to destroy the Allied spy system in Holland.

Although Schreider and Giskes could not stand the sight of each other, they co-operated as leaders of the two espionage systems. Giskes reported to Admiral Canaris, and Schreider to Reichsminister Himmler.

On a certain day, a dropped agent, Lieutenant Louwers is brought before Schreider. We know from the information given by Colonel Somer, head of the 'Information Bureau' in London, that all dropped agents were instructed to confess immediately when they were captured and not to give the Germans an opportunity to apply third degree methods. When Schreider captured Louwers, he found him such an easy victim, that he

immediately had a brilliant idea. "Just imagine", Schreider thought, "that this young man could be made to contact London in his own code and with his own identity check. The British will never believe that it is I who am sending the message. They will think that it is their own trusted agent, and in that case the British will undoubtedly reply with valuable information".

He began by instructing Louwers to tell London that he (Louwers) demanded immediate assistance. It worked. London did not suspect anything and sent Godlof, who was equally willing and gave everything to Schreider: his code and his identity check. In this manner, Schreider was given two lines to London. After this game had been played for some time the genial Schreider had an even better idea. He knew that every illegal group would not rest until the had their own contact with Britain. London had a most perfect collection of information on the Dutch illegal organisations. Wouldn't it be possible, Schreider thought, to receive information on all these organisations via the lines he now had at his disposal? In such a manner he could roll up the whole illegal movement in Holland.

In this, too, Schreider was successful. London gave all the information he wanted: names and data, collaborators and their headquarters. Let me suffice by saying that during two years, until April 1944, Schreider used 18 Dutch 'lines' to London and was given all the information he wanted about droppings, names, addresses, leaders of illegal organisations,etc., while London also gave the necessary information via Radio Orange.

The result was a blood bath such as history never knew before. Thousands and tens of thousands were sent to Luttringhausen and Bergen-Belsen.

These facts have been proved; even Noel de Gaulle will have to concede to thi for the simple reason that it cannot be denied any longer, they were established during the trials of van der Waals, Poos and Slagter.

NOW FOR THE ENGLANDSPIEL AS IT WAS REALLY PLAYED..................

There are three possibilities:

Firstly, that London had no idea of what was happening and walked head over heels into the German trap committing, as the President of the Court in Rotterdam stated, 'unbelievable mistakes'.

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them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such ~~a~~ practice~~s~~. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to ~~remark~~ embark at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the

Secondly, Noel de Gaulle's solution, which is an attempt at proving that the treachery was committed in London, within the ranks of the Intelligence Service itself.

Thirdly, that it has been the determination of London to betray these thousands and to sacrifice them in order to achieve a far greater military or political aim.

Let me begin by saying that this final possibility, namely, that the British purposely allowed the underground movement in Europe to be slaughtered by the Germans for the sake of a political aim, is the only true answer.

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The young men, or even worse, the young women who volunteered in London to be dropped over occupied territory, had to follow a course at the so-called school of agents. There, they were taught everything in connection with espionage work, i.e. the lower grade, nothing about the higher espionage. In the latter case no one would have volunteered for the job; they were told what to do in case they fell into enemy hands and, especially in this connection, the technique of signalling. They were told, that shortly before being dropped, a high military officer, usually a colonel, would give them their identity check. Aspirant parachutists were continuously briefed on the importance of closely adhering to these instructions. The whole principle was based on the so-called identity check. If an agent, once having fallen into enemy hands, were to give his correct identity to the Germans, this would mean that the confidential reply from London would also land with the enemy, with the most catastrophic results.

It was of the highest importance that the wrong identity check should be given to the enemy, since London would then immediately know that he had been captured. In that case, London could try to liberate him or exchange him for a German spy captured by the Allies. The agents were also given to understand that they did not run the slightest danger by giving off a wrong identity check since only the aforementioned high military officer and they themselves knew the secret of the true check. Consequently, there was no reason for the Germans to disbelieve them if they gave off the false check.

As soon as a message was received from a dropped agent this was sent to the colonel concerned, for the purpose of controlling the identity

check. An extra security was the so-called 'handwriting' from which the typically individual manner of signalling could be recognised by an experienced telegraphist. The telegraphist would immediately understand that something had happened, if the agents altered their usual 'handwriting'.

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The first agent of the Englandspiel, Lieutenant Louwers , was dropped in Holland and captured by the enemy. He was questioned by Schreider personally. True to the lessons he had learned in London, Louwers pretended to be afraid, and readily confessed. After having been threatened in the typical German manner, the so-called cowardly agent was browbeaten into giving off his code and his identity check. Naturally, he gave off his false check. At the same time, he agreed to send messages for Schreider. His first message was to ask for assistance and information on when an assistant could be dropped. Naturally, Louwers believed that London had immediately recognised the false check, and would know that he had fallen into enemy hands. The message which Louwers expected in return was that agents could not be sent on the mere request of someone in Holland. Who, however, can describe Louwers' surprise when the London reply contained all the information he had asked for. Naturally, Schreider immediately instructed Louwers to continue contacting London.

Louwers was left no choice; he tried everything, from twisting his identity check and his handwriting to faking his messages. But London remained dumb and promptly sent the second agent. He then decided to risk his own life and ended all subsequent messages with the word 'caught'. London still failed to understand: the second Englandspiel victim was sent.

But London sent yet another message. According to van der Waals, a British agent was instructed to contact Schreider, and demand that Louwers should immediately stop signalling. Schreider took no further risks and all subsequent messages were sent by employees of his own German organisation.

Approximately 65 parachutists were then dropped at carefully announced moments. But why did the British authorities have to notify Holland beforehand? The answer is simple: so-called reception committees had to be organised in order to receive the parachutists as they landed.

But there is something fishy here: if the idea had been to organise reception committees, these should have consisted of other parachutists, or at least members of the underground organisations.

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them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such ~~a~~ practice~~s~~. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to embark ~~remark~~ at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the accusation that we were trying to conceal something

THIS HOWEVER NEVER HAPPENED WITH THE ENGLANDSPIEL AGENTS.

But there is more; some parachutists were equipped with an address where they had to report if, through some technical hitch, they were not found by the reception committee. The address was: Rochussenstraat 85, Rotterdam. IT WAS THE ADDRESS OF ANTONIOUS VAN DER WAALS. Surely it is clear now that London wanted these Englandspiel agents to fall into enemy hands. No one can suggest that Intelligence Service was not clever enough to know that this was van der Waals' address. There was yet another mysterious point. Normally, the aircraft needed some 45 minutes to drop men and material, but no German night fighters ever appeared on the spot. Did this never strike London as being strange? According to Antonious van der Waals, it did, and London subsequently instructed Schreider to shoot down an occasional plane AFTER THE DROPPING. Schreider, the typical German, gave orders to shoot down every fifth aircraft.

Schreider has stated that all 65 parachutists handed over their identity check. Colonel Somer, head of the Information Bureau in London, is quite positive in saying that this is untrue. The surviving parachutists, Dourlein, Ubbink and Louwers are also equally positive in their denial.

There is no doubt that they are right, since these boys knew only too well that by giving off their correct identity check, they would be guilty of giving away their own comrades. They also knew that in doing so they would have spoilt their own chances of remaining alive, while furthermore the Germans could never check up whether their identity check was false or not. Consequently, Schreider committed purgery.

DURING A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS SCHREIDER DESPATCHED AND RECEIVED THOUSANDS OF TELEGRAMS OF THE MOST CONFIDENTIAL AND DANGEROUS NATURE, FROM THE CONTENTS OF WHICH IT MUST HAVE BEEN PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE SENDER HAD FALLEN INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY.

No wonder that our former Minister of Defence refuses to submit copies of these telegrams to the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee, and that the office in Baker Street, where all the telegrams were received, 'accidentally' caught fire. LONDON MUST HAVE KNOWN THIS, SINCE IT IS RIDICULOUS TO SUPPOSE THAT IT HAD ESCAPED THEIR ATTENTION.

Noel de Gaulle suddenly discovered that an agent of the German Secret Service was employed in the Deciphering Department in London, who rubbed out false identity checks and replaced them by the true identity check. This is a ridiculous theory. Even if the whole office had been

full of spys, the Germans could never have rubbed out the false check, since it was a secret between the parachutists and the colonel who had accompanied them on their flight to Holland.

Every parachutist had certain instructions, on which he had to report at regular intervals, while he also had to return to London after having completed his assignment. Even after two years, 65 parachutists had nothing to report, and they never returned, for the simple reason that they were locked up in the Seminarium at Haaren, and were later murdered. Regular messages were received from 18 of these 65 agents, containing a continuous stream of questions of a strictly confidential nature, but nothing else. Why did it never occur to the London Secret Service people to ask what they wanted all this information for. Why did they never ask about a report on their original assignment? Because LONDON KNEW PERFECTLY WELL WHERE THE AGENTS WERE AND TO WHOM THE HIGHLY DANGEROUS REPLIES WERE SENT.

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I shall now proceed to prove the aforegoing.

During August of the year 1943, two parachutists returned to London, viz. Dourlein and Ubbink. They too had been captured by Schreider, but had managed to escape from Haaren to London, with the assistance of a policeman named Billen - the same who was later 'accidentally' liquidated. They had faced innumerable dangers, but remained undaunted, because they were possessed of one great idea, namely, to return to England and organise aid for their captured comrades. Another reason for their return was to put an end to the unbelievable British mistakes.

After arriving in London they were locked up by the Intelligence Service and it took two months before Major General de Bruyne heard their story. The result was incredible. After hearing them, he turned round and left them without a word.

Although it has been ascertained that in August 1943 the head of the military Intelligence Services had been advised of the fact that all parachutists, to whom London had 'accidentally' sent the information which led to the Englandspiel, had been gaoled in Haaren THE ENGLANDSPIEL CONTINUED UNTIL APRIL 1944.

Do I have to point out that all information from London was followed by the liquidation of a group of illegal fighters? London was continually advised by underground workers of these tragedies, but it never occurred to them that there was a certain similarity between the

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them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such ~~a~~ practices. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to ~~remark~~ *embark* at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the accusation that we were trying to conceal

something

catastrophies. Do I have to remind the reader that even after Dourlein and Ubbink had told their story nothing was done to help the captured parachutists in Haaren.?

Do I have to point out that LONDON MUST HAVE KNOWN that the identity checks were false, since they had to include false identity checks in their reply? That after the information given by Dourlein and Ubbink, London refused to investigate the reliability of the 18 different lines held by Schreider? London continued to send its messages along these lines, and hastily transferred the two agents who had managed to escape.

I will not go into any further details since facts and circumstances have made it sufficiently clear that Britain has wittingly played the Englandspiel and that there is no question of an 'unbelievable mistake' made by London in this connection.

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I shall now consider the second possibility, namely, the story written by Noel de Gaulle, and I will prove that his theory is a fraud. The hero in de Gaulle's story is a certain Eerbeeck, During his youth, Eerbeeck joined the N.SB. and became admirer of German National Socialism. He fell in love with a German girl, but as soon as he learned that his girl had been seduced by a National Socialist he developed an uncontrolled hatred for everything connected with the German Movement.

The head of the Netherlands Intelligence Service appreciated Eerbeeck's hatred for the Germans and since the young inspector was a most efficient official he offered him a job, When war broke out, Eerbeeck was instructed to remain in Holland and to use his connections with the Dutch National Socialist Movement in being introduced into the Gestapo.

Every insider will understand that this is an impossible theory. The Gestapo was so well organised that they had full record of all the agents formerly employed by the Netherlands Intelligence Service. Consequently, it is ridiculous to suggest that the German organisation would employ a man who was known to have been a Dutch agent.

The second mistake made by de Gaulle is that his hero was simultaneously employed by the Nachrichtendienst and the S.D. 'Abwehr' Department. These two Services had to keep a check on each other's activities, and no one person could possibly be employed by both.

De Gaulle describes how Eerbeeck comes to the conclusion that something fishy is going on, and that the fault lies in London. The writer does not say how the young counter-spy makes his discovery, but, although Eerbeeck possesses his own receiving and transmitting set, he decides to visit London via Portugal, to see the Intelligence authorities in person. Giskes, his Chief, apparently a most gullible official, agrees to give Eerbeeck ten days leave to spend in Portugal. Portugal of all places, the hot-bed of espionage. In due time Eerbeeck is picked up and taken to London, where he is interviewed by a number of high-ranking officials, who are so shocked by his story that they immediately decide to take measures and return Eerbeeck to Holland. Again, there seems to be something wrong with de Gaulle's story: if the fault lay with London, why did Eerbeeck have to go back to Holland?

De Gaulle then trys to put a romantic touch to his story by bringing in Eerbeeck's new girl friend, whom he suddenly discovers in a Paris gaol. The result of his mission to London, however, is not very convincing IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE VISIT TOOK PLACE DURING THE SUMMER OF 1943, THE ENGLANDSPIEL CONTINUED UNTIL APRIL 1944.

I now come to the third possibility. Did the London authorities devise this Englandspiel in order to attain a far greater political and military aim? I used to think that this was nonsense, but came to a different conclusion. The war was not decided in the West, but in the Far East, namely, in Japan. Japan was the only truly dangerous Ally of Germany. When the Japanese had lost the greater part of their fleet, they were finished as an aggressive power. A relatively small Germany therefore stood alone, without sea communications and raw materials. The Germans were left to face the combined forces of the United States, Britain and Russia. From the military point of view their fate was sealed, and their sole importance was that of a force in the struggle for world domination which had then already arisen between the Allies and Russia.

This is where the resistance movement proved its value to the British. Their activities gave the Germans an excuse to avenge themselves on the civilian population and to draw large amounts of manpower from Holland to German industry. The German industrial potential was therefore strengthened and became an important factor in the Western conflict with the U.S.S.R. From this point of view, London was interested in the underground movement, and continued to urge the Dutch into ever-increasing resistance.

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them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such ~~a~~ practices. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

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something

When the powerful British Empire emerged from the 1914-18 war, she was no longer a dominating power. The Americans had won the war in two months time, saved the U.K. from utter collapse, and put an impoverised Europe back on its feet. The British had forfeited their leading role, and the United States, on realising their own strength, refused to return to their pre-war secondary place. On two issues, however, the Americans lacked experience, namely, on internal political relations in Europe, and on colonial affairs. Consequently, the U.S.A. gave the British a free hand in Europe and India.

Then came the second world war, and after Dunkirk an already weakened Britain was left to face the music. They managed to hold the fort, but the price was high. They had to give up India, the most important pillar on which their power and wealth depended. They now only had one source of income left: Europe. For ages they had followed a consistent policy with regards to the European Continent: that of divide and rule. By keeping the countries of Europe systematically at loggerheads, they succeeded in maintaining themselves as the most important power on the Continent. Here, however, a process was developing which caused them the greatest anxiety. Under the German heel, Europeans were re-born. They developed a renewed love for their own country, love for their Royal House and their own people. True courage and determination became the pillars of their self-respect and gave them the courage to shake off an insufferable load.

This new spirit was embodied in the resistance movement. In this movement the various nationalities found each other: they were brothers who shared the same West European culture.

But the British Intelligence Service realised that this was the beginning of a United Western Europe, which would never again fall into the trap laid for them by clever politicians, who for years had staked their money on the divide and rule policy. They understood that they would be impotent when faced by a united front. They knew that their polished Oxford students could never hope to have any influence on the men who formed the backbone of the resistance. They knew that West European resistance meant that Britain would lose its supremacy in post-war Western Europe, and in their opinion there was only one solution: to destroy all those who took part in this underground organisation. This was the Englandspiel. It was on this issue that Germans and British agreed.

It is argued that the British sent arms to Dutch underground workers. True, but not before 1945. But this also had been carefully planned.

When it became clear that the Germans would soon be defeated, thousands of undesirable elements joined the underground organisations. A large number of demoralised men and women, collaborators and criminals infiltrated into the resistance, and the result was that bona fide illegal workers resigned. The entry of these undesirables into what was once a team of upstanding patriots, caused the name and reputation of the underground movement to become a by-word. The purpose of the British is now clear: by supplying arms to these gangsters and bandits the spirit of co-operation and patriotism had been wiped out.

It is nonsense to believe that the Netherlands Government did not know what was going on. We know that before and after the liberation, the British Government had a powerful influence on the Dutch Government in exile. Why was Dr. van Mook, who favoured a policy of independence in Indonesia, made Governor-General in 1942? Why did the Netherlands Government fail to understand that the British could never suffer the Dutch to keep their colonial Empire? The British had already lost their own colonies, and it would have been intolerable to them if the Dutch had controlled colonial markets. Why was van Mook given dictatorial powers after the war? Why were emergency powers given to the military authorities, who were commanded by the British? Why did we have to suffer British interference of a certain Lord Killearn in Linggadjati?

The answer is clear: during the war and after liberation, the Netherlands Government in exile, and all subsequent post-war Governments have been completely in the grip of the British.

Maybe Goebbels was right, when he said:"Die Kleinstaterei ist aus".

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them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such practices. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to ~~remark~~ embark at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the accusation that we were trying to conceal

something

Registry No. 22738/1051/296

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

RHM.

Draft.

To:-

Sir Philip Nichols.

From:-

Mr. Shuckburgh.

Cleared by telephone with Mr Street, who thought it met the case excellently. 28/3

Copy to Mr Street
G. R. B.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

OUTFILE

March 1948.

TOP SECRET.

Since we spoke on the telephone on March 11th about the "Englandspiel", I have been following up with Hayter's friends your suggestion that we should try to prepare a statement more suitable for publication in the Netherlands than the ~~précis~~ draft which I sent to you in my letter of March 4th. (The reference incidentally should be corrected from Z 1785 to Z 2082/1051/29G).

2. I do not suppose that you will be altogether surprised to learn that as the result of research in the records of S.O.E., it has become evident that a really full explanation of the circumstances in which this penetration of S.O.E. took place would be to the highest degree embarrassing. In the first place, such an explanation would mean disclosing details of the methods used by S.O.E. and the Intelligence Organisation, and these would doubtless come as a shock not only to Dutch, but also to British public opinion. These methods are recognised as legitimate by the Intelligence fraternity, but there is nothing to be gained by publishing them to the outside world. We should also deplore the inevitable attendant association of the Foreign Office or of our Diplomatic Missions with such practices. I refer particularly to the use of "double double agents."

3. If we are to ~~remark~~ embark at all on a technical, historical or factual statement, we feel sure that anything less than a full explanation would evoke a flood of questions and lead to the accusation that we were trying to conceal

something

something, (as indeed we should be doing). As a result of the hearings before the Committee of Enquiry and the evidence at the various war criminal trials, there must be a large number of people in the Netherlands (many of whom in fact actually took part in these operations) whose knowledge of the facts is sufficient to enable them to see the inadequacy of any statement which purported to be a full explanation, and which, in fact, was not.

4. Neither will it serve, we feel, to select certain of Van der Starp's statements and expose them as inaccurate. We could for instance point out that Lt. Louwers was not, as stated in "Het Englandspiel", the first agent to be parachuted into Holland. This sort of thing might, perhaps, be used to suggest that "Het Englandspiel" contained so many inaccuracies that it was not worth taking seriously. But I am sure you will agree that this would not be satisfactory either. By commenting on one statement we should implicitly recognise an obligation to comment on all, and if we failed to do so we would again lay ourselves open to the charge of concealment.

5. Before I had received the views of Hayter's friends on the implications of issuing a full statement, I had thought that it should consist of two parts; the first covering the technical side, the second the political. The technical part would admit that serious mistakes had been made and would give circumstantial details to bear this out. The political part, on which the emphasis was to be laid, would dismiss as absurd Van der Starp's charge that there had been a conspiracy between ourselves and the Germans

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to decimate Dutch intellectuals and nationalists. ~~It~~ [The whole statement] would in fact have been more or less consistent with the line taken in the "Manchester Guardian" articles.

6. However, in view of the difficulties outlined above, we have now decided that it would be most unwise to continue along these lines. We should much prefer to issue no statement at all, trusting that the interest which has been aroused in the Netherlands will, in due course, subside. We realise that this may make things very embarrassing, particularly for you: if the Dutch Press is suspending judgment until an authoritative statement has been issued, it is likely to begin speculating ~~if~~ when none is forthcoming.

7. If we are eventually driven to making a statement of some sort, we ~~now~~ feel that the best thing would be to take a high moral line, stand firmly on the manifest absurdity of Van der Starp's story, and refuse to be involved in the technical, factual or historical details of this appalling story.

8. I should be glad to hear what you feel about this: I should also be interested to hear any comment which Danker may make on the "Selbourne Report".

[signature]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
THE HAGUE.

30th March, 1949.

150/21/49

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Z2737

TOP SECRET

My dear Evelyn,

Thank you so much for your Top Secret unnumbered letter of the 28th March about the "Englandspiel". I am very disappointed but not (as you surmise) altogether surprised to learn that the authorities are not prepared to issue a full statement.

Yours ever

Philip Nichols

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

7 1949

WESTERN

NETHERLANDS

22738 /G

22738 | 1051 | 29G

Sir P. Nichols (The Hague) to Mr. Hayter

Dated 10, Recd 29/March 1949

Approach to H.M. Embassy at The Hague by Mr. G. JONKER, new Defence Counsel for Anton VAN DER WAALS, Dutch collaborator.

Last Paper

22737

References

22737 | 1051 | 29G

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft.) Sir P. Nichols The Hague from Mr. Shuckburgh 7th May

Letter Mr. Jonker w/c draft. 7th May

(Action completed) [initials] 13/5.

(Index) [initials]

Next Paper

22739

(Minutes)

See Mr. Russell's minute on Z2739 & Mr. Street's minute on the same paper.

[signature]

29/March.

Mr. Street

1) F.O. minute, Mr. Street no. 213/F of 25th April.

See within: –

35390

Minutes. Western G. P.W.

Z2738 213/F

Mr. Halford.

Reference Z.2738/1051/29G.

I am sorry that it has taken so long to establish the facts of this rather unfortunate case. C. has now agreed that in all the circumstances it would be better to place the true facts on record and I have therefore compiled the attached statement. Subject to the views of Western Department, I suggest that it might be sent to Mr. Jonker with a covering letter from the Embassy, and it might be as well if a copy were also sent to Mr. Denker for his information.

Western Department may also be interested in the attached extracts from the Dutch newspaper "Haagsch Dagblad" of May 21 and 22, 1945. They make it clear that we could not possibly maintain a denial of Van der Waals' allegation.

John Street
J.E.D. Street.

25th April, 1949.

Mr. Mason,
Western Dept.

Halford 26/iv/49

/ As usual

[illegible] is a damaging one, but agreed that we must answer Jonker's letter, and that no answer could avoid this admission.

Sir P. Nichols thought that it would be better for the F.O. to send the reply than for the Embassy to do so, because any repercussions

Minutes. / would

Minutes.

As usual, the reservations are more on our side than on that of Mr. Holford's friends. Mr. Streets' draft letter for Mr. Jonker is full and yet discreet. However, we must be careful not to disclose any information which could be used as a lever for prising more information out of us on the "Englandspiel" than we have authorized Sir P. Nichols to disclose in his statement to the Dutch press.

With this aim in view I have discussed Mr. Streets' draft with him and we have agreed on the revised draft which I now submit.

In fairness to Mr. Jonker we must answer his main question, which is: Did van der Waals have good reason for believing that Schreieder was a British agent? The revised draft

/ gives

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

gives the answer without bringing the counter charge that van der Waals was largely responsible for the "Englandspiel" betrayals.

Robinson

28/April

I have ~~[illegible]~~ discussed the attached draft reply to Mr. Tonkers and the draft covering letter, with Sir P. Nichols, whose first reaction is that it would be better for the reply to Tonker to be sent from the Foreign Office than from the Embassy at The Hague.

He ~~has~~ was surprised that Mr. Halford's friends should be prepared to issue a statement along the lines of the revised draft, and even more surprised to learn that they are willing to disclose a great deal more. He considers that the disclosure that we used van der Waals as a double agent is a damaging one, but agreed that we must answer Tonker's letter, and that no answer could avoid this admission.

Sir P. Nichols thought that it would be better for the F.O. to send the reply than for the Embassy to do so, because any repercussions

Minutes.

/ would

would be directed against the F.O., which is an impersonal organization, and not against the Embassy, which is closely linked with the Dutch public.

He said he would like to have the opportunity of considering this question when he returns to the Hague on 4th May.

I am inclined to agree with Sir P. Nichols that it might be better for the reply to Jonker to be sent from the Foreign Office.

Rowan
29/April

We can only do as suggested above: I have, however, redrafted the letters to M. Jonker & to Sir P. Nichols. These have now been cleared again with Mr Short; ~~if agreed~~, they should be sent off in the bag on Monday May 9th. (They have not at any stage gone to legal advisers.)

John Russell
5.5

JOHN RUSSELL.
WESTERN DEPT.

Rowan
10/May

Ente. Soon

BRITISH EMBASSY,
THE HAGUE.

10th March, 1949.

SECRET

22738

Dear William,

We recently received a visit from a Mr. Jonker, who has now taken over the defence of Anton van der Waals, the notorious collaborator whose appeal against the sentence of death already passed has still to be heard by the Dutch courts.

He has now sent us a letter, of which I enclose a copy.

2. This letter puts us in some difficulty. Mr. Jonker is clearly going to be hard put to it to put forward a case for his client; but he could certainly be tiresome to us if he went into court and said that when he approached the British authorities he was referred by London to The Hague and then by The Hague to London, and could get nowhere. We have of course only got Mr. Jonker's word for it that the War Office have referred him to us, and on the face of it it seems unlikely that they would have done so.

3. We are of course out of our depth in the matter, and it would certainly be most undesirable, on general grounds, that we should be involved. The normal course in a case of this kind would surely be for counsel to enlist the help of the Netherlands Embassy in London and with their aid to get in touch with the officials concerned in London (as indeed Mr. Jonker seems to have done in the first place).

W.G.Hayter, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

(Signed) G. Jonker.

what we do about his war-time activities, we feel

no/

BRITISH EMBASSY,
THE HAGUE.

4. In these circumstances we are informing Mr. Jonker that the considerations raised in his letter have been referred to the Foreign Office, and we will do nothing further until we hear from you. In this connection you may like to see my letter of to-day's date to Shuckburgh about the "Englandspiel", in which van der Waals figures.

Yours Ever

[signature]

(Signed) G. Jonker.

... but knowing what we do about his war-time activities, we feel

no/

COPY.

Mr. G. Jonker.
Advocaat en Procureur.
J/B No. 473.

AMSTERDAM Z. March 5th 1949.
Van Eeghenstraat 102 Telefoon 25287

To
The Chancellor of the British Embassy,
at The Hague.

Referring to the short interview given to me by your second secretary, Miss J.C. Petrie, and complying with the request of Miss Petrie I hereby state the business which brought me to the British Embassy yesterday.

I was appointed as the Counsel for the Defense of ANTONIUS VAN DER WAALS, about whom you undoubtedly are informed.

As both the activities of my client during the war and his travels to Germany after the German capitulation ask for a certain amount of explanation, I wanted an interview with the Military Authorities under whose command Captain Pittcock of the British Intelligence Service sent my client to Germany.

After having made enquiries I asked for an interview with the Director of the Legal Services at the War Ministry in London, but was told that such an interview could only be granted if the communication was made through the Netherlands Embassy.

On my request one of the staff members of the Legal Department of the Netherlands Embassy, Mr. De Jager L.L.D., contacted the War Ministry and brought back the instructions that I should address myself to you, as the only man of the Military Intelligence Service who knew anything of the matter was now stationed at the British Embassy at The Hague. The War Ministry would inform you about my interest in the case and as far as I understood request you to bring about the desired contact. (i.e. Van der Slap)

I am well aware that my enquiries lack, at the moment, much of the desired conciseness. Unfortunately the former Counsel of Van der Waal's saw fit to publish a booklet about the alleged diabolical "E-Spiel" of the Military Intelligence. Yesterday morning the Manchester Guardian reacted on this asking for an official statement.

I do not regard it as my duty to contribute to the confusion of issues or to jeopardize - if even only in a slight degree - the relations if not between our respective governments, at least between the peoples of our respective countries. But certainly I think it my duty to prove, how my client was able and even compelled to believe in Mr. Schreieder's <u>claims</u> to a membership of the British Intelligence Service.

I heartily wish to reach my goal in full concord with your government.

You will appreciate that from a legal point of view my client's life does not depend on preposterous allegations about the wish of the British to exterminate the Dutch intelligentsia. But it does depend on the probability that my client believed he was acting in accordance with the allied military leaders.

I shall be greatly obliged to you if you could bring about the desired contact with the officer said to be familiar with the issue, after which we could discuss ways and means to clarify the position and put an end to proceedings which to me seem to serve no sensible purpose.

I am, Sir, with due respect,
faithfully yours

(Signed) G. Jonker.

Registry No. 22738/1051/29 G.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Open.

JWR.

TOP SECRET.

5th May, 1949.

OUTFILE. 11c

Draft. Letter.

To

Sir Philip Nichols.
The Hague.

From

Mr. Shuckburgh.

9/5/49

Mr. Halford first.
not available: see engaged by Mr. Street.

5.5

RECEIVED IN DIVISION. 6 MAY 1949
6/5
9/5.

Copy to

Mr. Street.

(we see that his address is Amsterdam: but we perhaps he will be in the Hague, if the trial is to be held there.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I am afraid there has been a very long delay in answering your letter of March 10th to William Hayter in which you enclosed a copy of a letter from Jonker, the Counsel defending Van der Waals in his appeal against the death sentence. As you know from my letter of April 20th and from the conversations which you had with the department when you were over here recently, we have been busy on other aspects of this story, notably the line to be taken about the "England-spiel".

I enclose a letter addressed to Jonker as from the F.O. (together with a copy for your file and an extra copy in case you want to send one to Daalder): if, in the light of what I am now going to say, you have no objection to the terms of this letter, will you please have it delivered. We have drafted it as from the F.O. rather than from your Embassy, in order to meet the point which you made in conversation with the department, ~~and tried~~ viz. to spare the Embassy from too personal an involvement. This letter should reach you by bag on Tuesday morning: we understand that the hearing of the appeal is to start the next day, so the letter to Jonker should be delivered without delay.* From our point of view it is not a bad thing that it should reach him so late, since he will thus have less time for awkward come-backs. Were there any doubt about the guilt of Van der Waals, this might appear a rather cynical and immoral thing to say: but knowing what we do about his war-time activities, we feel

no/